随着时代的发展，传统侵权法中的以衡量被侵害方“损害”为着眼点的赔偿制度体系已经很难满足对被侵害方的充分保护，以及遏制不法行为的要求了。这一方面是因为，从被侵害方的角度来说，对于一些新型界定的权利客体的侵害很难被证明或者很难被证明实际损失的具体数额，因此在原有的、以“实际损害”为标准或者要件的体系，如损害赔偿、不当得利等很再给予充分的赔偿和保护。另一方面，从侵害人角度讲，由于一些侵害带有故意的、以获利为目的的性质，所以就算通过原有的赔偿体系或者利益返还机制对可以证明的损害部分加以赔偿，侵害人依然可以获得大量剩余的利益。这种情况既不符合传统上公平公正的道德理论，又难以通过法律的手段遏制这种恶性行为的动机，更甚至因为法律保护的不充分，变相鼓励了这种侵害行为的发生。因此，顺应着这种时代的要求，各国都逐渐开始建立本国关于应对这种“损失难以证明”或者”侵害人在法律的规制下依然能通过不法行为获利”的情况，通过规定将不法的获利赔偿给被侵害人的“获利赔偿”制度来对侵害人进行遏制以及对被侵害人进行保护。而我国，也在《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》第20条中规定了人身权益如果不能证明损失，可以按照获利来赔偿的方式，也即是承认了我国的获利赔偿制度。但是由于对获利赔偿在实践和研究方面时间尚短，所以关于获利赔偿的若干问题并没有完全明确。比如，获利赔偿的性质应该是什么？是否应当作为独立的请求权？其和其他请求权的区别在哪里？应当如何赔偿？获利大于损失，或者获利小于损失时，应当如何看待？其适用范围是什么？是否应当做扩大或者限缩该制度的使用？而本文就是基于这个背景，针对获利赔偿的若干问题加以探讨。值得一提的是，除了传统的解释论和比较法的方法，本文还大量应用了经济学的方法加以分析。这是因为关于获利赔偿问题的探讨，国内外之所以众说纷纭没有定论，其中一个很重要的原因在于现有的传统解释论和立法论等方法不足以把这些观点统一在一个框架内进行分析。因此本文通过经济学的方法，通过构建“外部性”和“谈判理论”的分析框架，对于获利赔偿研究中的一些难以阐释的问题予以分析和新视角的回答。
In modern era, the conventional loss-based damage can no longer protect the infringed sufficiently, and deter the infringing party effectively. On the one hand, it is difficult to prove the existence of or evaluate the infringement, and thus difficult to use the loss-based damage. On the other hand, even if the loss-based damage can be accurately implemented, the infringing party still obtains a residual surplus from “wrongs” when the gain from it exceeds the loss. In response to this newly emerging problem, many countries have been trying to introduce the gain-based damage into their legal system. In our country, the article 20 of《Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China》also mentions that gain-based damage can be applied to personal rights, but specifies no further details to answer to the following questions: What is the essence of gain-based damage? What is distinct in it compared to other claims of rights? How should it be implemented? Should it be contingent on whether gain exceeds loss? When can it be applied? This paper tries to tackle these unanswered questions.Especially to deserve to mention, besides the conventional explanatory and comparative approach, this paper adopts an economic approach, and provides a unified framework and logically consistent analysis that other approaches are weak in. This framework borrows the method of “game theory” and the concept of “externality” to study the interaction of self-interested individuals under a given legal system, and the optimal legal system that reconciles the conflict of interests between them.
