类别股是对基于股东“同质化”假定的“一股一权”这一股权禁止分离原则的偏离。现代公司理论和实践已经佐证了股东“异质化”的现实，类别股的发行将满足公司融资和治理灵活多样化的需求，也将满足投资者的不同投资和风险偏好.类别股赋予了股东平等新的内涵，并将推动公司融资和治理制度的演进。我国应采取类别股种类法定的立法模式，这是基于股权权利性质和我国控股股东控制权滥用以及投资者保护水平不高的现实考虑。财产权类别股和表决权类别股是类别股的基本类型，优先股和复数表决权股分别是这两者的典型代表。类别股发行将引发类别股股东与公司其他参与人之间新的利益冲突，限于篇幅，本文以类别股与普通股之间的利益冲突为研究中心。 由于类别股兼有债券和普通股特征，因此合同法和公司法对其叠加适用，合同法和公司法适用上将产生竞争和冲突。 合同是类别股利益冲突治理的重要机制之一，强缔约能力的类别股投资者应通过订立完备的类别股合同来保护自己。而对于弱缔约能力的类别股公众投资者而言，还需要法院事后基于诚信原则对类别股合同条款进行扩充解释的方式保护。 公司法规范是类别股利益冲突最重要的治理机制，其应严格类别股发行和交易的条件，强化类别股发行公司信息披露，赋予类别股股东以类别表决权来否决变更其类别权的行为，并且要求类别股与普通股的利益冲突交易应通过独立董事进行裁决，这些事前治理机制能够高效、经济地防范对少数类别股东的不公平侵害。 类别股发行公司中董事如果对类别股股东类别股合同权利以外的股权负信义义务，则面临“一仆难伺二主”的困境。论文指出，应对类别股种类和类别股投资者类型化决定是否给予董事信义义务保护，并区分不同情形确立董事信义义务的审查标准；其次，给予类别股股东信义义务保护的背景下，应贯彻公司利益最大化而非普通股股东利益最大化标准来协调；再有，不应以董事对普通股股东的信义义务来无效风险投资家—优先股股东与创业企业家—普通股股东之间关于公司收益和风险的事先商事合同安排。为防止类别股发行公司中控制类别股东滥用控制权，应确立控制类别股东对少数类别股东公平对待的信义义务，并通过判例指导确立不同类型交易环境中的信义义务内容。 异议股东股份回购请求权和股东诉讼权是类别股股东原权利—类别权的事后救济性权利。
Class shares is a deviation from the Ban separation principle that prohibit equity ’s residual claim right from equity ’s residual control right. That principle bases on the homogenization hypothesis of shareholder interest. However, legal theory and practice of corporation has proved the reality of the heterogenization of shareholder interest. Class share will meet the need of corporation finance and governance flexibility. At the same time, it will meet different invest and risk preference of investors. Class share gives new meaning of shareholder Equal principle, and will promote the evolution of corporate finance and governance systems. China corporation act should take the path that class share type should be decided by law, which is based on the reality that the controlling shareholder of Chinese listed corporation abuseing their control power and poor investor protection. This legislative model helps to increase predictability of class share’s category and right, and reduce transaction costs and capital market regulation difficult. Property class shares and voting class share is basic category of class share, preferred share and plural voting common share are the representatives of these two basic category of class share. Class share issuing will invoke conflicts of interest between the class shareholders and other corporation participants. The Dissertation centers on the conflicts of interest between the class shareholder and common shareholder. With the Characteristic of common share and debt, class share will be regulated by corporation law and contract law simultaneous, the application of these two private laws will generate competence and swing. Contract is one of the important governance mechanisms of conflict of interest class share governance. Strong contracting ability investors should make a complete class share contract to protect themseleves. As for the weak contracting ability investor, the court may make expanded explanation to the class share contract terms basing on good faith principle. Corporation Law is the most important governance mechanisms of conflict of interest between class shareholders and common shareholders. It should order strict requirement of class share issuing and trade, strengthen information disclosure, provide the class voting for the class shareholders, let independent director to arbitrate the conflict of interest between class shareholders and common shareholders. These mechanism of before the event could against unfair to minority shareholders from director or controlling shareholders effectively and economically. If Director from class share issuing corporation should owe fiduciary duty to the equity right other than class contract right, he will be faced with "a servant of two masters is difficult to wait," the dilemma. The dissertation argues that whether to provide fiduciary duty protection determined on category of class share and class share investors. Moreover, if class shareholders were provided fiduciary duty protection, director should implement to maximize the company's interests rather than the common shareholders’ interests. In order to prevent controlling shareholder from abusing controlling power, we should establish the fair treatment of fiduciary duty that controlling shareholders own to minority shareholders. The court should determine The fiduciary duty content under the different types of trading environment by the precedents that made by the the Supreme Judicial Court. Appraisal right and shareholder class action lawsuit is the relief of the right that protect original shareholder right—class right.
