30年间，学界陆续投入大量精力探讨，法条竞合的特别关系的适用原则，到底应是重法优先于轻法，还是特别法优于普通法。法条竞合的适用原则必须建立在正确的法条竞合判断标准之上。倘若法条竞合的判断标准失当，将不属于法条竞合的情形认定为法条竞合或者相反，在这种情形下，争论法条竞合的适用原则，大概只会一错再错。故扭转当前法条竞合的研究径路，将研究重心放到法条竞合的判断标准应为当务之急。想象竞合与法条竞合此消彼长，极易混淆；法条竞合的判断标准的主要功能在于合理区分法条竞合与想象竞合。我国通说与判例均认为想象竞合为实质的一罪，即仅按照最重一罪定罪量刑即可。实际上，想象竞合为数罪的量刑规范，在定罪时应将所涉各罪一一定罪，量刑时适用限制吸收原则。只有能够明晰想象竞合的本质，才能最终正确区分想象竞合与法条竞合，进而找到合理的法条竞合判断标准。我国通说认为，法条字面意思的包容与交叉是判断法条竞合的标准。但这种从字面意思出发的法条竞合判断标准过于形式化，必须结合法条保护的法益来进一步判断法条竞合与否。故正确的法条竞合判断标准包括形式标准（法条文字上的包容或交叉）与实质标准（一罪保护的法益与另一罪相同或者包含另一罪保护的法益）。在我国，实质标准虽已初见端倪，但学界既未翔实地论证，也未提供不同章节犯罪之间法益关系的具体判断方案，故鲜有用武之地。实质标准应用的关键是分类讨论罪状文字有包容或交叉且位于不同章节两罪的法益关系：位于不同公共法益章节的两罪，一罪的法益不可能包容另一罪；个人法益章节的一罪不可能保护公共法益章节另一罪的法益；公共法益章节的一罪可能既保护所在章节的公共法益又保护个人法益章节另一罪的法益。在公共法益章节一罪的法定刑低于个人法益章节的一罪时，通过“假定-反证”的论证手段来分析决定法定刑的三要素（不法、有责、一般预防的必要性）可以得出，我国刑法中公共法益章节的一轻罪不可能保护个人法益章节一重罪的法益，二者并非法条竞合。

The standards of statutory concurrence in criminal law consist of formalistic standard as well as substantive standard. The former requires that the wording of the relevant provisions incorporates or overlaps with each other; and the later means that the statutory concurren offences should share the same legal interests. Thus, the former could be named as “literal meaning test”, while the latter could be entitled as “legal interest test”.Two-tier standard for statutory concurrence in criminal law has started to take shape in China’s criminal law academics. However, due to the insufficient argument of substantive standard, and the absence of the detailed scheme for judging whether or not the legal interests are the same, when the relevant offences have been provided in different chapters in China’s Penal Code, “legal interest test” could not work yet.To restore the legal interest test in China, the author has took effort to develop an analytical approach to judge whether or not the legal interests of the provisons, the wording of which incorporates or overlap with each other in distinct chapters, are the same. As it turned out, offences provided in different chapers, both of which protect the public legal interests, could never share the same legal interests; the legal interest protected by the offence in chapter which protects the personal legal interest could be possiblely incorporated by the legal interest protected by the offence in chapter which protects public legal interests. However, in the latter case, if the offence in chapter which protects public legal interests carries more lenient statutory penalty than its corresponding offence in chapter which protects personal legal interests, it would be impossible to recognize statutory concurrence between the two offences. This is because that the offence with more lenient statutory penalty could never protect more legal interests than the offence with stiffer statutory penalty, and it follows logically that the relevant offences could not fulfill the “legal interest test” above.