土地财政的本质，是在我国政府主导的经济发展体制下，地方政府基于一系列制度约束，利用其对土地资源的垄断权力而采取的牟利行为。土地财政的形成、生存与发展集中反映了当前我国政治经济体制框架下的一系列制度痼疾。基于学术界相关研究基础，本文首先从土地财政的“财政”和“土地”性质出发，揭示转移支付制度体系的设计漏洞，以及我国两种土地公有制制度之间的矛盾，是导致地方政府行为异化、以地生财且谋求垄断利润最大化的制度根源。以财政体制和土地制度的弊端为出发点，本文又从中央与地方政府间关系的维度入手，揭示出改革开放以来中央与地方政府之间所形成的政府间寻租体制是导致土地财政得以生存并迅速发展起来的制度根源。中央与地方政府间寻租体制，同时又是我国政府主导经济模式的支柱，是中国经济高速增长的制度基础。地方政府土地出让收入，则已经成为维系中央与地方政府之间寻租博弈的重要一环。如不对这一寻租体制做出根本调整，地方政府以地生财的牟利冲动就不会停止。最后，基于2007-2011年313座地级市的统计数据，本文对2007年以来中央政府旨在规范地方政府土地出让收入的政策效果进行了实证评估。与学界普遍抨击的土地财政不利于地方政府公共服务水平的提高的论断相反，结果显示土地财政收入有力地促进了当地公共服务水平的提高。这同时也就证实了，土地财政绝非地方政府的“掠夺之手”，而是内嵌于我国政治经济体制设计之中的制度设计。因此，要彻底解决土地财政所导致的一系列弊端，纠正地方政府的牟利倾向，不能头痛医头、脚痛医脚。最终的解决之道，就是引入民意力量的制约，切实推进政治体制改革，消除地方政府谋求垄断利润最大化的制度根源。

The land-finance system is the rent-seeking process conducted by China’s local governments under a series of institutional restrains. The formation, survive and development of the system also reveal the flaws within China’s political economical structures. Based on past researches, this paper makes a thorough study on how the flaws in transfer payments system and confrontations between China’s two basic land own ship systems lead to the distortions of governments’ functions. Based on the major setbacks of China’s finance system and land own ship systems, this paper leads to the conclusion that the rent-seeking system between China’s central and local governments is the origin of China’ land-finance system. Meanwhile, the rent-seeking system between China’s central and local governments is the foundation of China’s government-led economical development model and China’s high rising economy. The land-finance revenue, on the other hand, has become a crucial part of the rent-seeking balance between two levels of governments. Local governments’ intentions to acquire rents from land will never cease unless this rent-seeking model can be adjusted. Finally, on basis of statistics picked from over 313 cities from 2007 to 2011, this paper made an empirical evaluation to the central government’s policies on regulating local governments’ expenditures of land revenues. Contrary to the conclusion made by the academia that land-finance income was against local governments’ expenditures on public services, this paper reveals that the land income after reform has greatly enhanced the public service level of local governments. Meanwhile, it supports the hypothesis that land-finance system is not the “grabbing hand” from local governments, but is embedded in China’s political economic structures.