德国著名社会学家卢曼认为,司法在现代法律系统中占据中心位置。本文结合他的一般社会系统理论和各种社会史、思想史、法制史资料,对该命题进行具体解释、合理重构和辩证评析,试图促进法学反思对现代司法乃至现代法律的既有理解,同时引入法学之外的宏观视角,倡导“社会理论之法”的研究路径。 在卢曼看来,司法成为法律系统的中心是社会演化的成就:随着原始“分割”社会 、传统“分层”社会向现代“功能分化”社会的演进,法律系统一方面“外部分出”,逐渐实现了“自创生”和“功能特定化”,一方面“内部分化”,逐渐形成了司法与立法、契约的中心/边缘结构。 司法中心的必然性可以溯源于“禁止拒绝裁判”原则的确立:即便立法、先例、契约语焉不详,法院也必须裁判一切案件,从而维持法律“稳定规范性行为预期”的功能,这种局面决定了司法的“决断”本质和中心位置。然而,欧陆法律解释学和英美司法技术的发展,都使现代司法的决断本质隐而不彰,需要以系统理论的方法予以揭示。 司法中心的必要性则在于:最终应对着现代法律系统的悖论,再生产其统一性,并有效缓解其外部压力。位于中心的司法和位于边缘的立法、契约分工协作,维系着现代法的五种张力,共同保障法律功能的实现。在现代政治系统和现代经济系统中,也可以发现类似的中心/边缘分化现象。 现代法学一般将司法视为对立法规则、先例原则、契约条款的“适用”过程,尤其强调立法、司法的等级关系,与系统理论视角的上述外部观察结论大相径庭。实际上,立法、司法的等级观念最初发端于绝对主权理论,后为近代以来的民主理论所强化,经概念法学和法律实证主义的传播,已固化为法律系统内部的自我理解,是故长期没有得到反思和纠正。 卢曼的司法中心论把握了现代法在封闭与开放之间的张力,凸现出其“偶连性”的特征,并且能够容纳法学的“内部观察”,富有洞见;但特定的视角也造成了各种观察盲点,表现为狭隘界定“司法”概念、过度强调系统封闭、忽视法律的系统特性、缺失规范性的研究维度。对其洞见与盲点加以辩证把握,可能发展出一种“大司法”概念,顺应当代法律发展的新趋势,走向“社会的司法化”。总而言之,卢曼思想对于中国法学的进一步发展具有借鉴意义。
Luhmann, a prominent German sociologist, held that judicature occupy the center position in the modern legal system. This paper aims to make a specific explanation, reasonable reconstruction and dialectical evaluation of this hypothesis by means of integrating Luhmann’s general social system theory and various material of social history, thinking history and legal history, manages to encourage jurisprudence to introspect the existing understandings of moderrn judicature and even the modern law. Meanwhile, a macro perspective beyond jurisprudence is introduced into this paper, which initiate the research way of ‘law in legal theory’. Luhmann maintained it was an achievement of social evolution that judicature gradually became the centre of the modern legal system. With the social evolution from ‘primitive segmental societies’ and traditional ‘stratifictional societies’ to the ‘modern functionally differentiated society’, legal system, on the one hand, ‘differentiated out’, which gradually achieved the ‘autopoesis’ and functional specification, and on the other hand, it started ‘internal differentiation’, which gradually formed a structure in which judicature occupies the center with legislation and contract in its periphery. The necessity of central position of judicature can be traced back to the founding of the principle—‘the prohibition of refusing to judge’: Even when the language of legislations, precedents and contracts is not clear, courts have to judge all the cases in order to maintain the law’s function of ‘stabilization of normative behavioral expectations’, which determines that the essence of judicature is ‘decision’ and the position of judicature is in the centre of the system. However, the essence of modern judicature—‘decision’, which has been covered with the development of European legal hermeneutics and judicial technologies of Anglo-Saxon, needs revealing by means of system theory. The central position of judicature is also an indispensable setting of modern legal system: Judicature ultimately deals with the paradoxes of modern legal system, which could reproduce the unity and effectively alleviate the external pressure; the central judicature and peripheral legislation and contract collaborate to keep up 5 types of tension of modern law, and guarantee the realization of legal function. Furthermore, the similar phenomena could be identified in the modern political and economic system. Modern jurisprudence, which generally regards judicature as an applying process of legislative rules, precedent principles and contract terms and places an especial emphasis on the hierarchy of legislation and judicature, is widely divergent from external observation conclusion of system theory. This hierarchical concept, which originated from absolute sovereignty theories, reinforced by modern democratic theories, and spread through conceptualistic jurisprudence and legal positivism, had been stereotyped as a self-understood inside legal system now. Therefore, it has been void of reflection and correction for long time. Luhmann’s theory of central judicature is insightful. It formulates the tension between closeness and openness of modern law, highlights the characteristic of ‘contingency’ of modern law, and could contain internal observation of jurisprudence. However, a specific perspective also gave rise to the blind spots, which is charactered by the narrow definition of ‘judicature’, over-emphasis on cloture of system, ignorance of the particularity of legal system and lack of normaltive dimension. By dialectically modifying the insights and blind spots of Luhmann’s theory, it might sprout a concept of ‘broad judicature’ which could comply with the new development trends of modern law and headed for ‘judicialization of society’. In a word, the thoughts of Luhmann are instructive for jurisprudence of China.