本文基于苏联时期切尔诺贝利核电站爆炸事故的解密档案及其他相关资料，再现了从1986年4月26日到1989年10月苏联政府对切尔诺贝利事故的应急处理工作过程，分析了在这个过程中苏联政府采取应急措施的原因、背景和条件。 笔者按照时间顺序，把事故发生后苏联政府所面临的问题性质以及采取的相应措施程度划分为三个阶段：第一阶段——面临突发事故的紧急应对（1986年4月26日—1986年5月6日）。在突发恶性事故后的11天内，苏联政府在不明事故原因和后果的情况下，迅速组建部长会议工作组、政府委员会等机构，围绕“控制反应堆放射性物质的泄漏”主题，采取了灭火、调入军队和清理事故人员、隔离事故反应堆、疏散附近居民等多方面的紧急措施，基本控制了放射性物质的大规模释放。第二阶段——消除事故影响的计划性应急处理工作（1986年5月7日—1986年8月中旬）。在第一阶段工作基础上，苏联政府根据获得的事故相关数据，围绕“消除事故影响”主题，陆续出台计划性应急处理方案，采取了封存事故反应堆、清理事故现场及周围环境、确定30公里“禁区”、保障疏散居民的医疗卫生和生活状况、深入调查事故原因及分析事故的长期后果等措施，使切尔诺贝利事故后处理工作进入有序状态。第三阶段——应急处理工作的公开化、国际化（1986年8月底—1989年10月）。切尔诺贝利核泄漏对全球造成影响，面对国际和国内的舆论压力，苏联政府不得不采取有限度的公开信息、改革机构、寻求国际原子能组织援助等措施，从而使切尔诺贝利事故的处理工作从苏联政府的行为转为国际化行为。 苏联政府处理切尔诺贝利事故经历了无序到有序，从盲从到有计划，从封闭到公开，从国内到国际化的过程，在体现苏联社会的计划体制特征的同时，也暴露了国家制度封闭性的缺陷。从科技史角度再现技术灾难应急处理过程，从政府组织管理机制的角度总结其中的经验和教训，不仅具有重要的理论意义而且具有现实的实践价值。
On declassified history archives of Chernobyl Accident and other related resources, this dissertation discusses the course of Soviet Government’s risk management of Chernobyl Accident. Meanwhile, it analyzes the reason why Soviet Government took those risk management measures, as well as its background and conditions at that time. Tracing the course of Soviet Government’s risk management of Chernobyl Accident, the present thesis is divided into three periods. The first period(April 26,1986—May 6,1986) was the government’s urgent reaction for Chernobyl Accident: Soviet Union immediately organized a governmental workgroup and a committee to undertake the jobs such as extinguishing the fire, evacuating the residents and offering medical treatment highlighting the restraint of the leakage of the radioactive reactors, which managed to prevent the radioactive substances from releasing in a larger scale within first 11 days. The second period(May 7,1986—middle of August,1986) was the planned emergency management to eliminate the effects of the Accident. To eliminate pollution caused by the Accident, Soviet Government introduced a scheme of emergency management projects, thus making smooth the dissolution of the aftermath of Chernobyl Accident. The third period(end of August,1986—October,1989) was the public and international of risk management. Due to the international consequences of Chernobyl nuclear leakage, in the face of international and domestic public pressure, Soviet Government had to take measures of limited information-publication, institution reformation and seeking for IAEA’s assistance. Accordingly, the management of Chernobyl accident changed from the behavior of the Soviet Government to the international acts. The course of Soviet Government’s management of Chernobyl Accident is a process which was from disorder to order, from sequacious to planned, from quarantine to open, from localization to internationalization. This course reflects the characters of the Soviet planning system, and reveals the limitation of the planning system’s confinements. This dissertation re-creates the process of emergency management of the catastrophes caused by nuclear technologies, and summarizes the experiences and lessons from the angle of government administration. Therefore, it possesses the precious theoretical significance and practical value.
