本文所欲探讨的是哈特思想中的法律与道德关系理论。几千年来，法律与道德的关系，或者准确地说法律有效性（合法性）与道德诉求之间的关系，一直是理论家们所要探讨的一个重大主题，并且已经引起了法理学中的许多重大争议。对于自然法学家来说，评价实在法的道德标准以及对其适用时的意蕴，自然是应予关注的要紧处。可这却让实证主义法学家们感到不安。在悠久的自然法传统中，经典自然法学家给我们留下了学多宝贵的理论遗产。其中最重要的就是在评价实在法时，引入了道德或伦理的因素。他们中，一些理论家试图从道德、信仰等资源中去寻找评价标准，而另外一些则试图在人类社会中通过理性的省察来发现一个“善法”的摹本。当然，他们之间并无必然的冲突，而且，事实上也的确有人试图综合考量这两种因素。相反，在英美法学界执掌牛耳近150年的实证主义法学理论则坚决主张法律与法律现象的自足性与自主性。他们的特点在于坚持认为判认法律的标准不在于道德或者伦理，亦不在于能否满足社会的期待，而在于是否符合一定的规则标准。法律实证主义的先驱者边沁承继了大卫•休谟“应然”与“实然”的两分，并将之引入法学理论。在他之后的实证法学家继承和发展了边沁，批评自然法学家混淆了“是”与“应该是”的区分。奥斯丁是最坚决主张法律与道德相分离者，某种意义上，是他挑起了一场实证主义法学家与自然法学家的大争论。20世纪中期，在经历了希特勒第三帝国以及前苏联斯大林暴虐统治的语境下，此一争论以一种更为激烈的形式表现出来。道德到底在法律中扮演什么样的角色，法律的有效性到底何在？道德与法律的关系的论战再一次浮上台面。而在这每一个方面，哈特都做出了重大贡献。哈特秉承边沁奥斯丁所开创之法律实证主义传统，坚持法律与道德的两分。他最重大的贡献是，在排除了道德之后，他为法律有效性找到了新理论基础——那就是承认规则。本文认为，哈特成功地捍卫了法律实证主义的传统和基本学说，捍卫了法律精神的自由主义、道德选择的个人主义以及法学理论的自足性。哈特去世后，以科尔曼、瓦路周为代表的包容性实证主义与以拉兹为代表的排他性实证主义，对他的理论也有争议。但他们的一个共识是：沿循边沁的脚步，在道德哲学与政治哲学领域里，哈特是自由主义传统最强大的代言人。在自由与个人以及社会福利之间保持一个明智的平衡的努力，居于其政治道德学说的核心地位。
In this thesis I want to discuss a question about one of H. L. A. Hart’s theories——the relationship between law and morality.The relationship between law and morality is one of the most important subjects for theorists over centuries. What on earth is the relationship between them? This has posed major questions on jurisprudence. The moral criteria for the evaluation of positive law and the implications of their application are the particular concerns of ‘naturalist’ theories but have also at various times troubled positivists. Over the long development of classical naturalist thoughts, a wide variety of theories and contexts may be found, but two principal categories of approaches are immediately obvious. They relate to the perceived source of the moral or ethical evaluation of positive law being addressed. Some theorists have sought criteria of evaluation in perceived or revealed higher sources of morality, religion or otherwise. Others have found the model for ‘good law’ in rational observation of human society. There is, of course, no necessary contradiction between these two ideas, and indeed some theorists have incorporated both elements. On the contrary, the positivist theories of law which were predominant in conventional Anglo-American jurisprudence for much of the past 150 years, and to a considerable extent still remain so, are broadly characterized by an insistence upon the autonomy of law and legal phenomena. In particular, laws are held to be recognized only according to formal criteria and not by reference to moral or ethical criteria of identification or to the satisfaction of social expectation. The separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ emphasized by David Hume and developed in the context of legal theory by Jeremy Bentham, is held by many positivists to be a fatal flaw in classical naturalist arguments, and the latter had been criticized for its confusing the categories of ‘is’ and ‘ought to be.’ The thrust of this argument was most graphically stated by Austin. So, there has developed a so-called ‘naturalist-positivist debate’ which has taken a variety of forms. There has been some concern with the role, if any, that is, moral criteria of evaluation or identification ought to be permitted. This question arose with particular urgency in the earlier part of the 20th century in the particular context of totalitarian abuses of positive law, notably in the Nazi Third Reich and in the former USSR under Stalin. There has also arisen the question of the extent to which positive law may properly be used to enforce moral propositions for there own sake. H. L. A. Hart has made very significant contributions to these areas of contention from a positivist perspective. He found a new theoretical foundation, rule recognition, for legal validity after the excluding of morality. In this thesis, I try my best to argue that Hart had defended the tradition of legal positivism successfully. Especially, he had provided justification or support for legal liberalism, individualism in moral choice and legal autonomy. As P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz has said, ‘he has clarified and strengthened the links between legal philosophy and moral and political philosophy……following in Bentham’s footsteps, he has been a forceful spokesman for the liberal tradition in morals and politics. The endeavor to strike a judicious balance between the liberty of the individual and the social good lies at the core of his political morality. ’
