分配是人类重要的经济和社会活动，不但决定着人们对于自然和社会资源的获得与占有，还关系到人们在社会中的权利和地位。正义作为最根本的社会美德之一，也成为分配领域的核心伦理价值。“分配正义”概念最早由古希腊哲学家亚里士多德明确地提出，与“矫正正义”一同成为正义的两个基本问题。随着时代的变迁，社会对于不同道德价值的追求，分配正义在不同的时代、不同的社会中，具有着不同的伦理意义。对于自然秩序的遵循，对于幸福、平等、自由权利的追求，成为分配正义最为主要的伦理目标。自然秩序、个人幸福和平等权利也成为主导分配的道德依据。在现代语境下，分配正义的伦理意义在于，保证人们能够享有平等的权利，在秩序井然的社会中自由追求幸福的生活。分配正义的主要问题在于，首先，在不侵犯个人自由的同时，如何通过分配保证他们具有实质的平等权利？其次，如何通过分配使人们得到他们应得的利益？围绕这两大问题，国内外学者们立足于不同的正义理论，从不同的路径出发，试图找到问题的答案。福利平等、资源平等、能力或者权利的平等成为分配正义理论关注的焦点。通过梳理这些平等观念所依托的正义理论，我们发现，以福利、资源或者能力为基础所进行的平等分配，都无法单独解决分配正义的根本问题。本文提出并论证的基于机会平等的分配正义理论，为分配正义的普遍实现提供了另一个不同的，然而却是较有解释力和实践性的视角。从机会的角度理解社会和自然资源的分配，将能够在更大的限度上维护人们的自由权利。机会平等的关键问题在于，如果把机会仅仅理解为概率或者可能性，而忽视机会背后所隐含的把握机会的能力、以及获得这种能力所必需的社会要素和自然要素，那么机会平等就会流于形式。本文围绕机会平等的正义理念，旨在建立以现代公民社会为背景、类似于沃尔泽“复合平等”的分配体系——“复合机会平等分配体系”，使人们不但能够在形式上获得平等的机会，而且具备相应的把握机会的能力。在这套分配体系中，平等不再停留在形式的层面，机会在实质意义上向所有人开放。更为重要的是，这套体系不但能够维护人们的自由权利，而且会保障社会成员之间的平等地位，从而实现现代伦理意义上真正普遍的分配正义。
As one of the most important economical and social activities, distribution of social and natural resuorces makes a deep and vast effection on the rights and social positions of people. Justice as a first social virtue, plays the core role in the just distribution as a basic moral value. The concept of “distributive justice” was brought forward definitely for the first time by Aristotle, the great ancient Greek philosopher. With the contrast to “rectificatory justice”, “distributive justice” became the basic subject-matter of Aristotle’s thoery of justice. In the history, different societies take different orientations of diverse ethical values according to the different social structures and conditions. Thus, “distributive justice” is filled with a variety of ethical means as social conditions changes. The basic meaning of distributive justice is to offer people happiness equally, to protect their rights of freedom and equality, and to process the distribution according to so called “natural order”. Therefore, “natural order”, personal happiness and right of equlity come to be the three ethical criterias of distribution. In modern society, there is the ethical meaning of distributive justice that the distribution should have all people share the equal rights, and make them able to choose the way of life they want to have in a “well-ordered” society. There are two problems involve in the distributive justice. Firstly, how to make people share the substantial equality while protecting their freedom from being interfered with. Secondly, how to give people the interests they deserve in social distribution. According to differenct theories of justice, scholars, no matter at home or abroad, have been trying to find a right answer by various ways. Generally, they focus their eyes on the equality of resources, that of welfare or entitlements and so on. However, none of these theories of distributive justice can find out a way to go through the basical problems involved in the subject-matter. The theory of equality of opportunities which I have tried to work out in this dissertation can, I do believe, find a new perspective from which we can go through or resolve to a higher degree the problem of how to taking up the distributive justice in a well-ordered society. We could do a better adjustment to protect the freedom rights of people in the procession of distribution if we can take the distributive justice into a deep consideration from the pointview of equality of opportunities. The problem is that we can not just regard the opportunities as probabilities or possibilities, while ignoring the capacity to bring up opportunities come into being. Otherwise, we would not get the true equality of opportunity. Here, we want to work out a just distributive system against the civil society background. The system is similar with the “multiple equality” advocated by Michael Walzer. By applying this system, we can make it sure that all the members of society can not only share the equal opportunities, but also can be equipped with the capacities to handle them. The “Distribution system of multiple equality of opportunity” that I have tried to justify would enable them to have the substantial equal rights to pursue their own happiness while enjoying their rights of freedom equally or fairly.
